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BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: TOWARD A
SOCIALIST-CONFUCIANIST CONCEPT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS FOR CHINA
David E. Christensen *
INTRODUCTION
Human rights exist to protect human dignity. I They are claims in
favor of the individual's interest, existing simply because the individ-
ual is a human being. Exactly what is it about the nature of a human
being that entitles us to these rights? Philosophers proffer various ex-
planations, most seeking to distinguish humans from other animals.
They note, for example, humans' upright carriage, 2 ability to reason,3
capacity to exercise a will and the autonomous nature of people,4 or,
conversely, 'the social and relational nature of humans.5 While there is
little agreement over the source and content of human rights, their
existence is widely recognized the world over by their codification in
international laW. 6
Human rights are a relatively new subject of international law.
Previously, what a government did within its own sovereign borders
was generally of no legitimate concern to any other State.7 After
World War II and the Holocaust, the United Nations was formed with
the protection of human rights as one of its primary purposes." Since
that time, there has been a growing body of binding international law
* Associate, Honigman Miller Schwartz and Cohn, Detroit, Michigan. San Francisco State
University, A.B.; University of Michigan, A.M. (1991); University of Michigan, J.D. (1991). I
am grateful to Professor Donald J. Munro for his encouragement and valuable insights and to
Leslie J. Christensen for her searching questions and comments.
1. See generally U.N. CHARTER pmbl.; Universal Declaration of Human Rights pmbl., G.A.
Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/818, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
2. ERNST BLOCH, NATURAL LAW AND HUMAN DIGNITY 186 (Dennis Schmidt trans.,
1986). Bloch uses "upright carriage" as a metaphor for human dignity, which provides the ine-
luctable basis of natural law.
3. JACQUES MARITAIN, RIGHTS OF MAN AND NATURAL LAW 37-38 (1945).
4. IMMANUEL KANT, THE MORAL LAW 95-96 (HJ. Paton ed., 1956); see infra Part II.
5. Ambrose Y.C. King, The Individual and Group in Confucianism: A Relational Perspective,
in INDIVIDUALISM AND HOLISM: STUDIES IN CONFUCIAN AND TAOIST VALUES 57 (Donald J.
Munro ed., 1985); see infra Part I(B).
6. See infra Part I(A).
7. The concept of sovereignty was, and remains in part, inclusive of territorial and political
control, to the general exclusion of outside forces. Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A.
829 (1928).
8. See infra Part I(A).
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mandating specific standards that each government must meet regard-
ing the treatment of people within its jurisdiction. 9
The nature and content of human rights in international law have
since been the subject of great debate. On one side, there are the uni-
versalists, mainly Western nations, who argue that fundamental
human rights are universally applicable in the same fashion in all
lands.10 On the other side are the cultural relativists, including
China, "l who believe that each nation may adapt human rights stan-
dards to suit its own particular culture and level of development. This
debate has raged for decades while accomplishing little.
Many universalists believe that human rights are "natural" rights
that flow from God or nature.12 They consider the individual to be the
basic particle of society, and place primacy on the individual's inter-
ests over those of the collective and the state.13 China has rejected the
universalist position. 14 There is no parallel concept of the independ-
ent, "atomistic" individual as a possessor of rights in Chinese cul-
ture. 15 Instead, Chinese society puts primary emphasis on the
collective, to which individual rights are subservient. 16 The Chinese
State has codified this concept in its Constitution. 17 China's socialist
leaders believe that natural rights are a fallacy, and deflect interna-
tional criticism by arguing that human rights are purely an internal
issue in China. ' Not surprisingly, little progress has been made in the
rights area: China's people still suffer, while its human rights obliga-
tions to its people and the international community remain unmet.
This Note offers an alternative perspective on international human
rights that seeks to bypass the dead-end universalist-cultural relativist
debate, and proposes a concept of human rights that is harmonious
with the modern collectivist and socialist Chinese order. Since human
rights protect dignity, this study finds the source of human dignity in
China in society, not in nature. This analysis opens the door to the
development of a meaningful set of guaranteed individual rights for a
socialist state and a Confucian order.
9. See infra Part I(A).
10. See infra Part II(A).
11. Tian Jin, Complexities of Human Rights in Today's World, BEIJING REV., May 28-June
3, 1990, at 14.
12. See, e.g., STEVEN LUKES, INDIVIDUALISM 45-47 (1973).
13. Id.
14. See infra Part 1I(B).
15. LUKES, supra note 12, at 45-47.
16. Id.
17. XIANFA [Constitution] art. 51 (1982) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter 1982 CONSTITUTION].
18. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
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Part I begins with a discussion of the pertinent international law
governing human rights, followed by an explanation of the systemic
weaknesses in China's political-legal structure that result in violations
of that law. It will show how this condition has continued in part
through China's adherence to an outdated version of absolute sover-
eignty as a shield against increasingly intense legitimate international
criticism in the human rights realm.
In analyzing the forces engendering such violations, Part II will
explore the respective roles of the individual, government, and law in
Chinese society. To better understand the Chinese setting, these find-
ings will be juxtaposed against the Western concept of rights and the
individual. In answer to the universalist insistence that no new con-
cept of rights is necessary since natural rights apply to all human be-
ings, Part III will explore why Western natural rights philosophy
cannot be adopted in China. Part IV proposes a new locus of human
dignity and rights in China. Finally, Part V proposes a set of guaran-
teed rights that promotes both the priorities of government and the
maintenance of human dignity.
I. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND CHINA
In China, the effects of Confucian collectivism, promoted by impe-
rial bureaucrats and modern socialist philosophy, have combined to
reject the primacy of individual rights in favor of the interests of the
Party and the State. This low prioritization of human rights has led to
violations of international legal standards for the protection of those
rights. This Part will survey the law requiring protection of human
rights, and outline the structural shortcomings in China that allow
ongoing violations of these standards. This will be followed by a dis-
cussion of China's defensive application of absolute sovereignty princi-
ples, which fosters human rights abuses by turning a deaf State ear to
offers of international guidance.
A. International Standards of Human Rights
International law requires the government of China to meet spe-
cific standards of protection of human rights. These obligations are
created by China's participation in the two oldest instruments gov-
erning human rights: the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (Universal Declaration).' 9 It is debatable whether
peremptory norms of international law, orjus cogens, impose any ad-
19. See U.N. CHARTER; Universal Declaration, supra note 1.
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ditional human rights obligations on China. 20
Treaties among States are a legitimate source of international law,
and participation in a treaty creates a binding legal duty on the parties
to meet the obligations it delineates. 21 China became a party to the
U.N. Charter in 1971 and was an original supporter of the Universal
Declaration.22 In fact, the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of
the Universal Declaration was marked by China. 23 The principles
contained in the Universal Declaration are generally considered by the
international community to be an expression of customary law. 24
China participates in several other human rights conventions, 25 but
the rights contained in those treaties, with the exception of the Con-
vention Against Torture, will not be the focus of this discussion. The
scope of this Note is limited to a very few basic rights, the adoption of
which would not require an alternative political system nor detract
from China's modernization efforts. This is not an argument for de-
mocracy, it is merely a call for a meaningful guarantee of basic human
rights.
20. For a thorough discussion on this issue, see THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW (1989); Oscar Schachter, International Law in
Theory and Practice: General Course in Public International Law, 178 R.C.A.D.I. 13 (1985).
21. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, pmbl,.
art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 332, 339, 8 I.L.M. 679, 690; Statute of the Int'l Court of Justice
(annexed to the Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945) art. 38(1), 59 Stat. 1055 (entered
into force Oct. 24, 1945).
22. On October 25, 1971, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2758, which recognized
the representatives of the People's Republic of China as the only legitimate representatives of
China to the United Nations. G.A. Res. 2758, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 2, U.N.
Doc. A/8429 (1971). For the voting record of the Universal Declaration, see U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 183rd plen. mtg., at 933, U.N. Doc. A/777 (1948).
23. Paper Marks Anniversary of Rights Declaration, F.B.I.S. DAILY REPORT CHINA, Dec. 6,
1988, at 3.
24. For discussions of the customary law characteristics of the Universal Declaration, see
Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than
States, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 17 (1982); see generally MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN
RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1980).
25. China has ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov.
20, 1989, U.N. Doc. A/Res/44/25, 28 I.L.M. 1448 (signed by China Aug. 29, 1990); Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for
signature Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc.
A/39/51 (1985), 23 I.L.M. 1027, as modified, 24 I.L.M. 535 (ratified by China Oct. 4, 1988)
[hereinafter Convention Against Torture]; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 14, 19 I.L.M. 33
(ratified by China Nov. 4, 1980); International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment
of the Crime of Apartheid, opened for signature Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243 (ratified by
China Apr. 18, 1983); Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31,
1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (ratified by China Sept. 24, 1982); International Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Dec. 21,
1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (ratified by China Dec. 29, 1981); and Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (rati-
fied by China Apr. 18, 1983).
Human Rights for China
The U.N. Charter recognizes the interdependence of peace and the
protection of human rights, and repeatedly proclaims the protection of
human rights as one of its four primary purposes. The preamble
states: "We the peoples of the United Nations, determined ... to reaf-
firm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of
the human person, in the equal rights of men and women . . . have
resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims . ,,."26 U.N.
members are bound to take "joint and separate action in cooperation
with the Organization for the achievement" 27 of "universal respect for,
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion."'28
In 1948 the United Nations passed the Universal Declaration with-
out opposition, other than the abstention of Saudi Arabia, South Af-
rica, and the East Bloc.29 The Universal Declaration's preamble
similarly recognizes that the "inherent dignity [and] ... the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the founda-
tion of freedom, justice and peace in the world," and establishes that
"human rights should be protected by the rule of law."' 30 In order to
fulfill these aspirations, it outlines numerous universal rights, includ-
ing the right to equality of rights without regard to race, color, sex,
language, religion, opinions, national origin, property, birth, or other
status;31 the right to life, liberty, and security of one's person;32 the
right not to be tortured;3 3 the right to equality before the law;3 4 the
right to effective remedies before legal tribunals for rights violations;a 5
freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile;36 the right to a fair
public hearing by an independent judiciary in criminal proceedings 37
with a presumption of innocence guiding the proceedings; 38 the right
to travel and the freedom of residence;3 9 and the freedom of thought,4
26. U.N. CHARTER pmbl. Other references to the U.N. intent to protect human rights are
found in id. arts. 1(3), 13(b), 55, 56, 62, 68, & 76(c).
27. Id. art. 56.
28. Id. art. 55.
29. U.N. GAOR, 3d sess., 183d plen. mtg., at 933, U.N. Doc. A/777 (1948).
30. Universal Declaration, supra note 1, pmbl.
31. Id. art. 2.
32. Id. art. 3.
33. Id. art. 5.
34. Id. art. 7.
35. Id. art. 8.
36. Id. art. 9.
37. Id. art. 10.
38. Id. art. 11.
39. Id. art. 13.
40. Id. art. 18.
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expression,4' and assembly. 42 The Universal Declaration also outlines
numerous important economic and social rights.43 Thus, the U.N.
Charter and the Universal Declaration articulate clear legal standards
that are binding on China under international law.
B. China Has Fallen Short of International
Human Rights Standards
The Chinese government has fallen short of the standards of
human rights protection imposed by the U.N. Charter, the Conven-
tion Against Torture, and the Universal Declaration. Documentation
of human rights violations in China is voluminous, 44 and this Note
will not add to that body of work. Instead, this Part will explore some
of the structural weaknesses in China's legal and political system that
permit, indeed perpetuate, abuses of international human rights
standards.
1. Constitutional Shortcomings
The Chinese Constitution45 includes many of the same rights as
the United States Constitution, including the rights to liberty, 46 free-
dom of speech, 47 press,48 assembly,49 petition,50 and religion. 51 The
differences in the two documents lie in their purpose and structure.
The Constitution of the People's Republic of China does not serve as a
contract between the government and the governed. It does not re-
serve some powers for the federal and state governments while leaving
all the remaining powers vested in the people, to which U.S. citizens
are accustomed. 52 The 1982 Constitution is a descriptive document
that creates the State, 53 and outlines the form of government5 4 the
41. Id. art. 19.
42. Id. art. 20.
43. Id. arts. 21-29.
44. See, e.g., ASIA WATCH COMMITTEE, PUNISHMENT SEASON: HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA
AFTER MARTIAL LAW (1990); ASIA WATCH COMMITTEE, REPRESSION IN CHINA SINCE JUNE
4, 1989 (1990); HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA (Edwards et al., eds., 1986); YUAN-
LI WU ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1988).
45. 1982 CONSTITUTION.
46. Id. art. 37.
47. Id. art. 35.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. art. 41.
51. Id. art. 36.
52. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
53. 1982 CONSTITUTION arts. 1-32.
54. Id. arts. 57-135.
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leaders have established' s or aspire to attain in the future. The State
creates citizenship for the people, and grants them civil rights.56
A second difference is that the U.S. Constitution is intended to
limit the State's incursion into individual rights, while the Chinese
counterpart primarily acts to protect State interests from incursion by
individual interests. 7 Under the 1982 Constitution, the Party always
has the final decision where citizen's rights are concerned, putting to
rest any argument that the 1982 Constitution merely balances the in-
terests of the Party, the State, and the people.58 Accordingly, the in-
terests of the Party and the State supersede the rights of citizens.
Furthermore, in China, rights are granted only in return for per-
formance of certain duties.5 9 Because rights are viewed as "the expres-
sion of the will of the class in power,"' 6 human rights are politicized
in China. This is consistent with the Marxist conception of law as a
class tool.61 In a capitalist society, law is used to repress the proleta-
riat and uphold bourgeois interests. 62 In a socialist society, law is used
to suppress the bourgeois class interests. 63
Accordingly, rights may be limited for certain people at the whim
of the State or Party, whenever their exercise would be interpreted as a
threat to the "Four Cardinal Principles" of Chinese society. These
Principles provide the structure of the society and the source of its law
as an expression of the Party's socialist values. Living up to the Four
Cardinal Principles requires adherence to: (1) the pursuit of the so-
cialist road; (2) the maintenance of the proletarian dictatorship; (3) the
preservation of the Communist Party's leadership; and (4) adherence
to Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought." As a fundamental
55. Louis Henkin, The Human Rights Idea in Contemporary China: A Comparative Perspec-
tive, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA, supra note 44, at 7, 27.
56. 1982 CONSTITUTION arts, 33-56.
57. The 1982 Constitution provides that "[tlhe exercise by citizens of ... their freedoms and
rights may not infringe upon the interests of the state, of society and of the collective ... 1982
CONSTITUTION art. 51.
58. Id.
59. The 1982 Constitution states that "[elvery citizen enjoys the rights and at the same time
must perform the duties prescribed by the Constitution and the law." 1982 CONSTITUTION art.
33.
60. Zhang Mingnai, Law - Indication of Interests and Wishing of Government Class, FAXVE
YANJIV [Studies in Law], No. 1, 1990, at 14, 15.
61. See infra notes 211-16 and accompanying text.
62. Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program, in THE MARx-ENGELS READER 530-31
(Robert C. Tucker ed., 1972).
63. The State and Revolution, in 2 V. I. LENIN, SELECTED WORKS IN Two VOLUMES 292-98
(1952).
64. See generally 1982 CONSTITUTION pmbl.
Winter 19921
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constitutional principle, no deviation from these tenets is tolerated.65
However, what is considered to be deviation is open to interpretatioin
by the Party.66 Thus, Chinese citizens must earn their rights through
politically correct thought and behavior.
In China, the fundamental human rights mentioned in the 1982
Constitution are not generally realized because that document is not
enforceable against the government. There is no independent court
with jurisdiction to settle constitutional questions.67 Furthermore,
while the 1982 Constitution outlines numerous, seemingly expansive
rights and freedoms, it lacks procedural protection for transforming
the paper rights into everyday reality. In contrast, the U.S. Constitu-
tion more fully guarantees human rights protection because it is inter-
preted and enforced by an independent judiciary guided by
precedent.68 While the 1982 Constitution is expressly the supreme law
of the land in China, it is freely interpreted and amended by the Party-
controlled legislature,69 leaving people's rights subject to political
winds. Without procedures to effectuate rights or consistent, in-
dependent judicial standards by which to check Party and government
actions, there can be no genuine guarantee of basic human rights as
required by the Universal Declaration. The declaration that the 1982
Constitution is the supreme law of the land is rendered meaningless if
that "law" can be altered, interpreted, or left unenforced at the politi-
cians' discretion.
2. Weak Legal System
In order to be stable, human rights must be anchored to the rule of
law. China's legal system has not developed due process protections
that meet the standards aspired to by the Universal Declaration.70 In
the past, the People's Republic of China has not relied on written legal
codes; in fact, it was not until 1979 that China enacted its first compre-
65. See generally 1982 CONSTITUTION.
66. Id. arts. 62 & 67.
67. Although Article 126 of the 1982 Constitution asserts that "[t]he people's courts shall...
exercise judicial power independently and are not subject to interference by administrative or-
gans," Article 128 makes the courts responsible to various levels of the Party.
68. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2. By using this comparison, this Note does not hold up the
United States as a model of complete human rights protections, but the United States has
progressed toward guaranteeing equal protection by reducing instances of routine politically mo-
tivated violations of human rights.
69. 1982 CONSTITUTION art. 62.
70. The Universal Declaration implicitly calls for procedural regularities in its exhortation of
equal treatment before the law (art. 7); effective remedy by tribunals (art. 8); prevention of arbi-
trary arrest or detention (art. 9); fair hearings for criminal charges (art. 10); presumption of
innocence (art. I1); and prevention of arbitrary interference in people's privacy or honor (art.
12). Universal Declaration, supra note 1, arts. 7-12.
[Vol. 13:4"9
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hensive criminal code.7I The nation's law has been made by cam-
paigns, directives, and interim regulations that are both informal and
frequently impermanent. 72 This type of lawmaking does not lend itself
to nationally uniform interpretation or application. It is inherently
inconsistent and subject to change without public notice, leaving the
masses unapprised of their rights. Procedural law was completely ab-
sent prior to the 1980s, and today, where it does exist, it is extremely
vague.7 3 Often times, this leaves citizens' rights up to the discretion of
a police detective or prosecutor, without any mandatory neutral re-
view. 74 Trials do not operate under a presumption of innocence.75
The judiciary is subject to political control, as it is directly responsible
to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.76 Tri-
als are frequently closed to international observation, especially in po-
litically sensitive cases.7 7 It is these cases that raise the most concern
about fairness and due process and, therefore, should be the last trials
closed to scrutiny.
The police have unusually broad discretionary powers. Fundamen-
tal rights are frequently left to mediation 78 between the accused and
the police, the party, or the collective.79 The police have general pow-
ers to accuse and sentence citizens to labor camps for "reeducation"
for up to three years without any judicial review, defense, or legal rep-
resentation.80  This legal scheme provides no reliable independent
check on law enforcement agencies. All of these characteristics of
China's legal system are in violation of the due process standards ex-
pressed in the Universal Declaration."'
Chinese law itself is frequently vague and open-ended. One partic-
ularly troublesome crime is "counterrevolutionary activities."'8 2 This
crime is subject to a broad, nearly all-encompassing definition. Party
71. P.R.C. Criminal Law Code, reprinted in FOREIGN LANGUAGES PRESS, THE CRIMINAL
LAW AND THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW OF CHINA i (Jerome A. Cohen et al. trans., 1984)
[hereinafter Criminal Law Code].
72. See VICrOR H. LI, LAW WrrHOUT LAWYERS 2-4, 13-15, 25-29 (1978).
73. R. Randle Edwards, Civil and Social Rights: Theory and Practice in Chinese Law Today,
in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA, supra note 44, at 7, 47.
74. Li, supra note 72, at 68.
75. See 4 MINZHU YU FAZHI 15 (1979) (arguing for a presumption of innocence); 3 MINZHU
Yu FAZHI 20-21 (1980) (successfully rebutting the argument for a presumption of innocence).
76. 1982 CONSTITUTION art. 128.
77. See, e.g., U.S. Assails Prison Terms, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1991, at All.
78. Edwards, supra note 73, at 46.
79. Li, supra note 72, at 69.
80. Edwards, supra note 73, at 66 n.43; see also Li, supra note 72, at 68.
81. Universal Declaration, supra note i, arts. 8-11.
82. 1982 CONSTITUTION art. 28 (indicating that one central task of the State is the suppres-
sion of "treasonable and other counter-revolutionary activities."). Articles 90-104 of the Crimi-
Minter 1992]
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control over the judiciary has hindered the development of definitional
boundaries on a prosecutor's use of this provision. The Criminal Law
Code provides some definition of counterrevolutionary activities, such
as considering the use of "feudal superstition" in carrying out counter-
revolutionary activities to be a crime.8 3 Unfortunately, no definition
of "feudal superstition" is provided in the Code. 84 Article 10 defines
counterrevolutionary activities as actions that "endanger the sover-
eignty and territorial integrity of the state, endanger the system of the
dictatorship of the proletariat, undermine the socialist revolution and
... undermine social order... [or] endanger society."85 A definition
of "endangering" or "undermining" is not provided, and is left open
to broad interpretation and potential abuse by the police agencies and
prosecutors.
3. The Human Rights Regulations
The Chinese Procuratorate has made an attempt at enforcing pen-
alties against government officials who violate human rights. The re-
cently enacted Rights Infringement Regulations86 provide an avenue
for citizens to file a report when their rights have been violated. The
report may then be investigated and eventually prosecuted. 87 Zhang
Siqing, the deputy procurator general, said that the rules provide the
people with a "weapon to protect their legitimate rights and interests
bestowed by the constitution. ' 88 They fall far short of their mark.
Examining a few of the provisions in the Regulations demonstrates
their weaknesses and reveals the government's lack of a genuine com-
mitment to safeguarding the rights the Regulations claim to protect. 89
Section II of the Regulations allows reporting the use of torture if a
State employee extorts an oral confession by torturing: (1) to vent his
nal Law Code give additional vague definitions of counterrevolutionary activities. Criminal Law
Code, supra note 71, art. 90-104.
83. Criminal Law Code, supra note 71, art. 99.
84. See A. James Gregor, Counterrevolutionaries, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PEOPLE'S RE-
PUBLIC OF CHINA, supra note 44, at 121.
85. Criminal Law Code, supra note 71, art. 10.
86. Regulations Specifying Requirements of Placing on File Cases of Infringements on Per-
sonal Rights or Negligence of Duties to Be Directly Handled by the People's Procuratorate, adopted
at the 27th Session of the 7th Procuratorial Committee of the Supreme People's Procuratorate,
reprinted in F.B.I.S. DAILY REPORT CHINA, Feb. 5, 1990, at 14 [hereinafter Rights Infringement
Regulations].
87. Regulations on Rights Infringement Promulgated, F.B.I.S. DAILY REPORT CHINA, Jan.
10, 1990, at 21.
88. Id.
89. This is further revealed in the fact that the investigation organizations handling these
complaints have heard 283,000 cases in the last 10 years, of which only 80,000 have been placed
on file for investigation and prosecution. Id.
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or her anger; (2) many persons or on many occasions; (3) by cruel
means, thus causing a bad influence; (4) in a way that results in injus-
tice and erroneous judgment; (5) in a way that wounds or cripples the
victim, causing his or her death, insanity, or suicide; or (6) in a way
that causes other serious results.90
This regulation permits the reporting of torture only in a narrow
range of cases. For example, this rule does not apply to torture result-
ing in a written confession. The police prefer a written confession over
an oral confession because the former is far more difficult to deny at a
later date. Element (1) requires that the torture be done in anger.
Aside from difficulties in proof, this element excepts cases where the
official does not get angry - where it is not personal, but only a part
of the job. Element (2) allows reporting only if the torturer victimizes
many people, or the same suspect is tortured "many" times. The rule
does not define what "many occasions" of torture means, but if a pre-
cinct rotates the torture duty among many officers, no single officer
will come under the scope of this provision. Element (3) allows re-
porting torture if it is "cruel" and causes a "bad influence." First,
how does one distinguish cruel torture from that which is not cruel?
Second, torture is unlikely to influence anyone beyond the victim if it
remains unknown. Rather than discouraging torture, this rule encour-
ages secret torture sessions. Furthermore, bad influence is not defined,
allowing a great deal of leeway to the police and prosecutors.
Element (4) is troublesome because once a suspect has confessed
and is convicted upon that confession, there is very little, if any,
chance of the falseness of that confession coming to light. In the Chi-
nese system, a defendant is entitled to an attorney only after he or she
has been officially charged and a trial scheduled. 91 This may precede
trial by only seven days, giving a defendant's attorney little opportu-
nity to prepare the case and bring out exculpatory facts.92 The police
will not be inclined to investigate further because they believe that
they have the guilty person, based on the confession. Satisfying ele-
ment (4) would usually require the police themselves to uncover or
provide the exonerating evidence, amounting to an admission that
they violated the victim's rights. Needless to say, this is extremely
unlikely to occur. It is also reasonable to wonder how a prison or labor
camp inmate will be able to muster the facts to prove his or her inno-
cence while incarcerated. Element (5) allows for filing a complaint
90. Rights Infringment Regulations, supra note 86, sec. I.
91. P.R.C. Criminal Procedure Code art. 110, reprinted in THE CRIMINAL LAW AND THE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW OF CHINA, supra note 71, at 149.
92. Id.
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only if the torture led to the suspect's wounding, crippling, death, sui-
cide, or insanity. Therefore, there is no per se prohibition against tor-
turing to extort a confession. This does not meet the standards of the
Universal Declaration 93 or the Convention Against Torture.94
Section V of the Regulations relates to unlawful detentions. It al-
lows the reporting of such detentions if a State employee: (1) unlaw-
fully detains an innocent person by abusing his or her powers, thus
causing bad influence; (2) unlawfully detains a person and insults, ties
up, or beats him or her; (3) unlawfully detains a person on many occa-
sions, or many persons, or for a rather long duration of time; or (4) the
unlawful detention causes serious injury, death, suicide, or insanity.95
This section similarly exempts a wide range of circumstances. Ele-
ment (1) is troublesome because the police power to detain is ex-
tremely broad. Police may lawfully detain people for several years
without a hearing or judicial review. 96 Element (1) only prohibits ille-
gal detention of innocent persons, and only when that causes a "bad
influence." As with section II, "bad influence" is undefined. Element
(2) allows reporting of unlawful forcible detentions where the victim is
insulted, tied up, or beaten. 'This does not prohibit unlawful deten-
tions in solitary confinement or other extreme conditions that can be
equally cruel. Element (3) allows reporting where victims are fre-
quently detained unlawfully or for a rather long period of time. Not
only is the vague term "rather long" undefined, but, given the police
power to detain for extended periods, this could be a very long time
indeed. Element (4), which sets out the only per se violation in section
V, covers only a narrow range of cases.
Section VI of the Regulations deals with unlawful searches.
Searches may be considered human rights violations if an official
"abuses his powers to make an unlawful search" and: (1) unlawfully
searches the house or person to a "serious degree"; (2) searches unlaw-
fully on many occasions or many houses, thus causing a "very bad
influence"; 97 or (3) makes a search that leads to suicide or serious
property damage. This section also leaves the door open for a host of
rights violations.
The Regulations ultimately contemplate only a very narrow range
93. Universal Declaration, supra note 1, art. 5.
94. Convention Against Torture, supra note 25, art. 2 (declaring that all torture shall be
prohibited, even under exceptional circumstances); art. 4 (stating that torture shall be a criminal
offense under the domestic law of all ratifying States); art. 13 (stating that all alleged victims of
torture have the right to formally complain).
95. Rights Infringement Regulations, supra note 86, sec. V.
96. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
97. Rights Infringement Regulations, supra note 86, sec. VI.
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of violations as worthy of reporting, and far fewer as worth investigat-
ing or prosecuting.98 While there are general prohibitions against con-
fessions produced by torture and unlawful detentions in the Criminal
Code, 99 the Code provides no remedy to the victims when those laws
are violated. Such a remedial provision would deter abuses and safe-
guard the people's security. The Regulations could perhaps be broad-
ened by analogy in a court, but the common person lacks the training,
means, and access to legal advice necessary to make this a feasible
* tactic.
Because of the absence of genuine safeguards against official abuse
of human rights, China has failed to meet, or even approach, the inter-
national human rights standards outlined in the Universal Declara-
tion, and ostensibly endorsed by China. The next Part will explore
how international pressure to conform to these standards has been
rebuffed, allowing human rights violations to continue.
C. International Human Rights Conventions and Sovereignty
China adheres to a theory of absolute sovereignty. This stance is
not surprising given the country's devastating experience with West-
ern and Japanese imperialism in the nineteenth and twentieth centu-
ries, and has direct implications for international human rights law.
Under the regime established by the U.N. Charter and the Universal
Declaration, member governments' treatment of individuals is a legiti-
mate concern of international law. 100 While China applies this princi-
ple against other States,101 it does not acknowledge its own obligation.
China steadfastly maintains that all international criticism of its
human rights violations comprises illegal meddling in its internal
affairs. 10 2
98. See discussion supra note 89.
99. Article 136 of the Criminal Law Code proscribes the use of torture to coerce a statement.
Article 143 prohibits "unlawful detention," but fails to define the term. Criminal Law Code,
supra note 71, arts. 136 & 143.
100. See supra Part II(A).
101. China has supported international criticism and, in some cases, sanctions against Rho-
desia, South Africa, Chile, and Israel. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3116A, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp.
No. 39, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1977) (South Africa); U.N. GAOR 3d comm., 27th Sess.,
1910th mtg. at 19, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1910 (1972) (Israel and Southern Rhodesia); S.C. Res.
232, U.N. SCOR, 21st Sess., 1340th mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. S/INF/21/Rev.l (1968) (Rhodesia);
E.S.C. Res. 63, U.N. ESCOR, 42d Sess., Supp. No. 2, at 140-41, U.N. Doc. E/1986/22 (1986)
(Chile).
102. Ding Yuanhong, then China's ambassador to the United Nations, summarized China's
view, saying, "The United Nations may serve as an arena for international cooperation in the
field of human rights. Yet ... it has no right to meddle in the internal affairs of its member
states." Envoy Speaks on Noninterference, Human Rights, F.B.I.S. DAILY REPORT CHINA, Nov.
27, 1989, at 1.
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Traditionally, a State's sovereignty was absolute and inviolable
under international law. A government was free to do as it pleased
within its own domestic jurisdiction, limited only by international law
and its treaty obligations. Treaties restrain a State's sovereignty when
they impose a duty to act, or to refrain from action. 10 3 The State's
performance of the newly assumed duty then becomes a legitimate
concern of the other contracting States and, sometimes, the entire in-
ternational community.
In multilateral treaties such as the U.N. Charter and the Conven-
tion Against Torture, every State Party is legitimately concerned with
all other States Parties' performance of their obligations. It is there-
fore arguable that, in the realm of fundamental human rights, States
have only a limited sovereignty. 1°4 This postulate was evidenced
when the Smith Government in Rhodesia unilaterally declared its in-
dependence from Great Britain. Contrary to traditional notions of
State sovereignty, the international community did not consider this
action to be an exercise of national sovereignty, as the Smith Govern-
ment claimed. Instead, it condemned the Smith Government's actions
as a threat to international peace.' 0 5 Another example is provided by
the United Nation's refusal to recognize Transkei, a territory that
South Africa declared to be an independent state in 1976. The United
Nations considered it a sham that was intended only to aid
apartheid. °0 Additionally, widespread international concern and in-
ternational sanctions against South Africa over apartheid further
demonstrate that human rights are a legitimate subject of international
concern. 107 It is as though, where human rights are concerned, the
concept of government sovereignty has been transformed into the peo-
ple's sovereignty. In each of these cases, the government violated its
103. Louis Henkin has said:
The duty to carry out international obligations is the heart of the international legal system;
and that prime duty implies an ancillary duty to cease and desist from a violation.... [A]
breach of an international obligation is a wrong to the particular state or states to which that
obligation is due ....
Louis Henkin, Human Rights and Domestic Jurisdiction, in HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE HELSINKI ACCORD 29 (Thomas Buergenthal ed., 1979).
104. For a discussion of traditional and contemporary views of State sovereignty, see Helmut
Steinberger, Sovereignty, in 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 397-418 (Ru-
dolf Bernhardt et al. eds., 1987).
105. S.C. Res. 232, U.N. SCOR, 21st Sess., 1340th mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. S/INF/21/Rev.!
(1968).
106. G.A. Res. 31/6A, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 39, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/31/39
(1977).
107. Apartheid was found to be a threat to peace by the United Nations and mandatory arms
sanctions were declared in 1977. S.C. Res. 418, U.N. SCOR, 32d Sess., at 5, U.N. Doc. S/INF/
33 (1977). Voluntary economic sanctions against South Africa were established in 1985. S.C.
Res. 569, U.N. SCOR, 40th Sess., at 9, U.N. Doc. S/INF/41 (1986).
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own people's sovereignty just as effectively as if an outside invader had
done so. 108
However, it is not necessary to argue the case for popular sover-
eignty in order to make the point that international human rights law
turns a government's treatment of its citizens into a legitimate concern
of the international community. This principle is contained in the lan-
guage of the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration, both of
which China has signed or embraced. The principle of State sover-
eignty is found in Article 2, paragraph 7 of the U.N. Charter:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Na-
tions to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such
matters to settlement under the present Charter .... 109
This language has been repeatedly interpreted to limit intervention
in the internal affairs of a sovereign State.110 However, the United
Nations also explicitly seeks to promote human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms for all peoples."' The preliminary draft and comments
to Article 55 of the U.N. Charter reveal the framers' intention to link
international peace with human rights observance. 1 2 The dependence
of peace on the protection of human rights is also expressly recognized
in the preamble to the Universal Declaration.
Several branches of the United Nations have assumed the responsi-
bility of overseeing, investigating, discussing, and making recommen-
dations regarding the human rights situations of its members. Prior to
the excesses of the Pinochet regime, the noninterventionist, absolute
sovereignty principle ruled in the General Assembly where human
rights were concerned."13 In 1974 this was reversed when the General
Assembly passed a resolution in opposition to the abuses in Chile. " 4
This was the begining of increasingly vigilant activity by the Human
108. See W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary Interna-
tional Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 844, 866 (1990).
109. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7).
110. See 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, U.N.
GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974); 1970 Declaration on Princi-
ples of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Ac-
cordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess.,
Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissability of
Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and
Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6220
(1965).
I1. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
112. U.N. CHARTER art. 55(c).
113. See Roberta Cohen, People's Republic of China: The Human Rights Exception, 9 HuM.
RTs. Q. 447, 489-90 (1987).
114. Id. at 490.
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Rights Commission."I5 Progress was bolstered by the Carter Admin-
istration's emphasis on singling out individual Member States and
make them accountable to the international community for human
rights abuses. 116 All these activities, carried out by the Human Rights
Commission, the Third Committee, and the Fourth Committee, are
widely supported by the U.N. membership as legitimate functions.
As a member of the General Assembly, the Human Rights Com-
mission, and as a party to numerous human rights treaties, China ac-
tively participates in monitoring human rights violations.11 7 By its
very participation, China has promoted the development of interna-
tional human rights law and further legitimized international involve-
ment in this formerly domestic matter.
Contrary to its assumed obligations and international duties aris-
ing out of these instruments, China has consistently used the "non-
intervention" language in Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter to deflect
criticism and reject guidance from the international community re-
garding its own human rights condition. 1'8 Even if this assertion
were valid, such a pledge to cooperate requires, at a minimum, an obli-
gation not to undermine human rights in the way that China's system
has done." 19
Since 1949, China's foreign policy has adamantly clung to the prin-
ciple of absolute sovereignty. China's guiding precept of foreign policy
is contained in the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" outlined
in the 1954 Sino-Indian Trade Agreement.120 Four of the Five Princi-
ples relate to the notion of absolute sovereignty. 121 The official press
frequently insists that "no country should attempt to impose its own
social system and lifestyle on others from the outside," and that
115. By the early 1980s, the U.N. Human Rights Commission had begun monitoring condi-
tions in Poland, Argentina, Kampuchea, Iran, Afghanistan, El Salvador, Sri Lanka, and others.
Id.
116. Id.
117. China is a member of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights and the Sub-Commission
on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. It has participated in resolu-
tions criticizing human rights practices in Chile, E.S.C. Res. 63, U.N. ESCOR, 42d Sess., Supp.
No. 2, at 140-41, U.N. Doc. E/1986/22 (1986); and Israel and Southern Rhodesia, U.N. GAOR
3d comm., 27th Sess., 1910th mtg. at 19, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1910, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/27
(1972).
118. See, e.g., The History and Reality of Human Rights, F.B.I.S. DAILY REPORT CHINA,
Jan. 5, 1990, at 12.
119. See JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 293 (6th ed. 1963).
120. Agreement on Trade and Intercourse, Apr. 29, 1954, P.R.C.-India, 229 U.N.T.S. 57.
121. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are (1) mutual respect for sovereignty and
territorial integrity; (2) mutual nonaggression; (3) mutual noninterference in internal affairs; (4)
equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful coexistence. All of these principles except (4) em-
phasize sovereignty. Id.
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human rights are solely an internal matter for China. 122
Until joining the United Nations in 1971, China rejected participa-
tion in the international community, international jurisprudence, and
international law, considering them to be instruments of domination
for the imperialist powers.1 23 Finding it necessary in order to develop
its economy, China has joined the international community and now
accedes to international law, considering it part and parcel of interna-
tional relations. Acceptance of international scrutiny of its compli-
ance with its international obligations is not only legally mandated,
but will ultimately assist China in the development of its socialist legal
system while improving foreign relations and trade.
II. EAST IS EAST AND WEST IS WEST: DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS
OF RIGHTS
Many in the West believe that rights are natural to all humans and
therefore universally applicable. Many Chinese have a very different
conception. This Part will first outline the precepts of Western natural
rights to provide a background for exploration of Chinese concepts of
the individual, the State, and law. This will set the stage for discard-
ing the old notions of rights and introducing a useful -concept of
human rights for China.
A. Western Understandings of Rights ,
Some of the most influential Western philosophies place primacy
on the individual as the basic unit of society. This concept can be
traced back to the Old and New Testaments, where a direct relation
between God and the individual is articulated. 124 The individual's
natural worth under the "sovereign will of God" takes precedence
over national or social concerns. 125 In eighteenth century Europe,
Judeo-Christian natural rights theory, originally conceiving of the
common good of the religious community, became the theoretical ba-
sis for asserting the inviolability of private property rights and per-
sonal liberty from intrusions by the government.
For the Enlightenment philosophers of this period, individualism
122. See, e.g., Wu Xiongcheng, The International Climate and the June Rebellion, BEIJING
REv., Sept. 11-17, 1989, at 13, 15.
123. See Ying T'ao, Recognize the True Face of Bourgeois International Law from a Few
Basic Concepts, 3 GuoJI WENTI YANJIU (Studies in International Problems) 49-51 (1960), cited
in JEROME COHEN & HUNGDAH CHIU, PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 36 (1974);
HUNGDAH CHIU, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE LAW OF TREATIES (1972);
SAMUEL S. KIM, CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS AND WORLD ORDER (1979).
124. See, e.g., Ezekiel 18:2-4; Matthew 25:40.
125. See also LUKES, supra note 12, at 45-46.
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encapsulated "the ultimate moral principle of the supreme and intrin-
sic value, or dignity, of the individual human being .... ,,126 This
principle was at the core of the philosophies of Locke, 127 Rousseau, 128
and Thomas Paine, 129 but was best expressed by Kant:
[E]very rational being, exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means
for arbitrary use by this or that will: he must in all his actions, whether
they are directed to himself or to other rational beings, always be viewed
at the same time as an end .... Persons, therefore, are not merely
subjective ends whose existence as an effect of our actions has a valuefor
us: they are objective ends - that is, things whose existence is in itself an
end, and indeed an end such that in its place we can put no other end to
which they should serve simply as means .... 130
This philosophy conceived of people as possessing certain innate at-
tributes as human beings, which attributes provide the basis for a set
of rights, or claims, that the government must respect and protect, and
gave rise to the concept of "natural rights" based on natural human
attributes derived from nature or God. The content of these natural
attributes was less certain than the firm belief in their existence. Kant
stated that each individual exists as an end in itself,13 1 while various
classic individualist theorists found other inalienable human rights
such as liberty 132 and property.' 33
Natural rights are deemed more fundamental than any other prin-
ciples found in the positive law. Being founded on innate qualities of
human beings, these rights existed prior to any social organization
and, therefore, take priority over any societal or political interests.
This implies a duty on social organizations to protect human rights.
Natural rights found their expression in the U.S. Declaration of Inde-
pendence, and in the Declaration of Rights proclaimed by the French
Constituent Assembly in 1791, which bifurcated the "imprescriptable"
natural rights of man and the rights of a citizen of France. t34 The
126. Id. at 45 (emphasis omitted).
127. See generally John Locke, Second Treatise, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Pe-
ter Laslette ed., 1967).
128. Rousseau wrote, "Man is too noble a being to serve simply as an instrument for others
.... " Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Julie, ou la Nouvelle Heloise, (1761) V, lettre 2, at 22 (D. Mornet
ed., 1925), quoted in LUKES, supra note 12, at 49.
129. ELIE HALEVY, THE GROWTH OF PHILOSOPHIC RADICALISM (1901-4) at 188 (M. Mor-
ris trans., 1934); see also LUKES, supra note 12, at 49.
130. KANT, supra note 4, at 95-96.
131. Id. at 98-99.
132. JOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERN-
MENT 9-11 (R.B. McCallum ed., 1946)
133. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1963); FRIEDRICH A.
HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER (1948).
134. LUKES, supra note 12, at 49.
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Universal Declaration places the highest priority on human rights, a
priority that transcends the importance of politics and class, by requir-
ing that all citizens be afforded equal and fair treatment by their
government. 1 35
B. Confucianism and Individual Rights
Modern Chinese society is the product of two belief systems, Con-
fucianism and socialism. Despite the revolutionary socialist transfor-
mation of traditional Chinese government and society, intractable
influences remain from thousands of years of Confucian teachings,
morals, and traditions. This discussion of Confucianism reveals an ab-
sence of individualism and describes a completely relational culture,
fostered by an all-powerful emperor who encouraged harmonious rela-
tions through respect and morality, and who had little use for the rule
of law. Confucianism's imprint has left behind a culture with little
respect for human rights and no legal recourse for their violation.
1. Family Relationships Are Fundamental
In China, a person is never considered an isolated entity, but is
always a social being. 136 A central thread running through traditional
Chinese culture is that the "individual is immersed and melted, dis-
solved in the collective... [and] simply does not have any independent
value of existence of his own, or any rights." 137
The family is the center of Chinese society, the basic economic unit
and the most fundamental of all relationships for Chinese people. Un-
like families in the United States, the Chinese family typically remains
a single unit living under the same roof, even after the sons marry,
although daughters leave the fold to move in with their husbands'
families. 138 When a child is born, it is born not only to its parents, but
to the entire homestead. 139 Older family members are cared for by the
group and, ideally, always live with the younger members. 140 This
creates large extended families living in close proximity and sharing
everyday life. The family is a communal group that cooks, eats,
sleeps, and works together. Traditionally, gentry families accumu-
lated wealth by holding land through the generations, creating eco-
135. See Universal Declaration, supra note 1, arts. 2-12.
136. King, supra note 5, at 57.
137. He Zhaowu, The Concept of Natural Rights and the Cultural Tradition, CHINESE STUD.
PHIL., Summer 1990, at 3, 25.
138. PAUL CHAO, CHINESE KINSHIP 13-15 (1983).
139. Id. at 42.
140. See id. at 13.
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nomic bonds among the family. 141
In traditional village society, families also provided the local polit-
ical leaders. The village was a political group usually composed of
several families, 142 although some villages contained only one lineage.
Leaders were drawn from elders of the important lineages in the vil-
lage.143 Disputes and altercations were usually handled within the
family or among the disputant families with a mediator, instead of
resorting to a court.'" Indeed, it was considered a failure to be unable
to find a harmonious solution and to end up as adversaries in court.
Ancestor worship was prominent in historical China. A family re-
lationship did not end at death; its form simply changed. Tradition-
ally, there was an ancestral hall where family members would make
obeisance to their departed ancestors.145 Family temples were often a
village centerpiece. 1' The temples had various income sources and
would frequently provide work, food, or shelter to needy villagers.' 47
Families even formed the backbone of China's ancient local de-
fense systems. The bao jia system of local common defense units was
first originated by Guan Zhong, the Prime Minister of the Qi State
during the waring states period (270 B.C.). 148 Baojia units acted as a
local security force, although they had varying responsibilities over the
centuries' 49 and survived in name up to the Communist period.' 50
Bao ia units, organized along family lines, show the extent that the
family has shaped societal institutions. 151
Common ownership of property, common political and security
concerns, and blood ties inextricably bound the family unit. Paul
Chao conceives of the range of relationships between various family
members as warp, and the relationships between the various functions
as woof, thus weaving the society together into a "functional, organic
structure."1 52
141. Id. at 133.
142. Id. at 145.
143. Id. at 152-53.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 148.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 150-52.
149. Baojia units were variously used to "control the whereabouts of the people, particularly
prisoners, fugitives and vagrants." In Tang times they were used to collect taxes. Id. at 151.
150. FEI HSIAO-TUNG, PEASANT LIFE IN CHINA: A FIELD STUDY OF COUNTRY LIFE IN
YANGTZE VALLEY 112 (1939).
151. CHAO, supra note 138, at 152.
152. Id. at 132.
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2. Sources of Chinese Dignity
Whereas in Western philosophy individual dignity is part and par-
cel of a human being's autonomous nature, China's emphasis on the
collective and its lack of individualism raises the question of the locus
of human dignity in Chinese culture. The answer begins with relation-
ships, because they are the center of Chinese society. There are five
cardinal relationships in the Confucian order: parent and child, ruler
and subject, husband and wife, old and young, and friend and
friend. 153 The five cardinal relationships do not all involve family
members - however, the non-kin relations found in the community
are patterned after the family, 154 so the community becomes an ersatz
family. The ruler-subject relationship parallels that of a father and
son, and friends are as brothers. Thus, community relationships
formed a "quasi-kinship bond."'' 5 Fung Yu-Lan summed this up by
saying, "The family system was the 'social system of China.' "156
In the Confucian order, societal harmony is the highest aspiration,
and it begins at home. Harmony-inducing social interaction is gov-
erned by elaborate rules of morality and behavior. The model Con-
fucian subject strives, through moral growth and education, to attain a
"higher moral exellence," "goodness," or "humanity" (ren),'57 thus
becoming a "gentleman" or "nobleman" (zhun zI).15 8 This nobleman
status is not comparable to Western hereditary nobility; it is a high
moral and social rank that is available for all to attain.' 59 This high-
lights the Confucian belief that all people are malleable and ultimately
perfectable through education and self-cultivation along strictly pre-
scribed lines. 160
One attains ren by meticulously observing elaborate social and cer-
emonial rites (h) and by practicing filial piety (xiao).'61 When asked,
"What is ren?," Confucius replied, "Curb your ego and submit to
153. King, supra note 5, at 58.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. FUNG Yu-LAN, A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY 21 (Derk Bodde ed.,
1960).
157. BENJAMIN I. SCHWARTZ, THE WORLD OF THOUGHT IN ANCIENT CHINA 76-77
(1985).
158. Id. at 76.
159. Inculcating and practicing the i shapes the individual into a socially acceptable human
being. See DERK BODDE, ESSAYS ON CHINESE CIVILIZATION 179 (Charles Le Blanc & Dorothy
Borei eds., 1981).
160. SCHWARTZ, supra note 157, at 77.
161. See id.
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li."162 Thus, "only through the established channels of li can one's
inner self-mastery make itself manifest to society and lead within to
the higher moral excellence of ren."'163 After all, it is the family that
teaches submission and the exercise of authority, both necessary for a
person of ren. This theory led Benjamin Schwartz to conclude that
"the family is the first school of virtue and source of those values that
makes possible a good society." 164
The 1i prescribe an individual's behavior in relationships in accord-
ance with the actor's role, status, rank, and age.' 65 Their function lies
in "teaching human beings to perform their separate roles well, in a
society whose harmony is maintained by the fact that every one plays
his part as he should within the larger whole."' 66 The li are the "ce-
ment of the entire normative sociopolitical order,"' 167 binding families,
communities, and, ultimately, the entire nation. The gravel and sand
forming this societal cement are cohesive families, bound together by
their moral members practicing the li.
The desire to perform the li is considered to be instinctive to man,
but it is not self-actualizing and requires the practice of filial piety. 168
Filial piety defines the tenor of relationships, outlining the required
deference, respect, and affection. Practicing filial piety dictates an en-
tire way of life:
A youth at home should observe the doctrine of filial piety, that is, fulfill
his duties in the best manner possible to his parents; and, when away
from home, should observe the doctrine of fraternal deference, i.e., to
fulfill his duties in the best manner to his elders. He should abound in
love to all and be attached to the virtuous. When he has leisure, he
should employ it in cultural studies. 169
Filial piety is considered a natural sentiment in human beings. ' 70 It is
the basis of the Confucian aspiration "universal love," and thought to
be the foundation of all happiness in people's lives. Piety affirms the
value of human life and is the most potent force for consolidating all
human beings into universal brotherhood.' 7'
A Confucian universal brotherhood can only blossom if it is rooted
162. Two other common translations are "He who can submit himself to ritual is good," and
"self-disciplined and ever turning to i." Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1o0.
165. Id. at 68; BODDE, supra note 159, at 179.
166. SCHWARTZ, supra note 157, at 67.
167. Id. at 68.
168. CHAO, supra note 138, at 73.
169. Chung Yung, Ssu Pu Pei Yao, ch. 18, at I la-1 lb, quoted in CHAO, supra note 138, at 73.
170. 2 MENCIUs, bks. 7.A.1 & 6.A.6. (D.C. Lau trans., 1984)
171. See CHAO, supra note 138, at 74.
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in a foundation of harmony and stability, provided by the moral up-
rightness of proper family and community interactions. According to
Donald Munro, "individuals [in Chinese society] do not possess senti-
ments, goals, interests, skills, and knowledge prior to or independently
of membership in a social organization .... [T]hese are formed in
society."' 172 In tracing the continuity of Confucian values in contem-
porary socialist China, Wenxiang Gong pointed out that ren stands for
the obliteration of the individual, the spirit of sacrifice, self-restraint,
lack of privacy, and ideological control. "The meaning of a person's
life is defined by his fellow men and by his community," and, in fact,
the "individual is insignificant without the community." 173 This is
analogous to the individual's relationship to the State and the collec-
tive, a relationship that is "constantly likened to that between fish and
water."'' 74 A human being without the fundamental relationships -
the family and the ersatz family - is no more than a beast. 175
By failing to participate in society, a person fails to utilize the intel-
lectual, aesthetic, and spiritual powers that distinguish humans from
other animals. It is only by using those capacities to contribute to
society, instead of simply fulfilling one's narcissistic wants, that one
can be truly human, the type of person society wants to protect. Thus,
a Chinese individual acquires humanity (ren), and thereby attains dig-
nity, through moral virtue attained from fostering harmony and stabil-
ity in the family and community.
3. Remnants of Confucianism
Humans are inextricably a part of their tradition, and the Con-
fucian tradition continues to influence the Chinese conception of
rights. The importance of the primary relationships has survived the
socialist reorganization of Chinese society. Relational orientation is
not unique to Confucianists in China, as Mao has said that all people
must "belong to some party, some class, or some nation," and "man
participates as a social being in every sphere of the actual life of soci-
ety."' 76 The deep-seated nature of traditional relationships and insti-
tutions is demonstrated by the resurgence of some of the traditional
market and village structures and other prerevolution relationships
172. DONALD J. MUNRO, THE CONCEPT OF MAN IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 16 (1977).
173. Wenxiang Gong, The Legacy of Confucian Culture in Maoist China, 26 Soc. ScI. J. 363,
365 (1989).
174. Id. at 366.
175. See CONFUCIUS, THE ANALECTS, bk. 18:6, IN THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS 220 (Ar-
thur Waley trans., 1956).
176. Mao Zedong, quoted in MUNRO, supra note 172, at 16-17.
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reappearing since decollectivization and liberalization in the 1980s.177
Many of the old traditional patterns and practices, such as ancestor
worship, are being taken up by young people who have never previ-
ously practiced them.
The 1i have left a legacy that is visible in many aspects of modern
China. Wenxiang Gong analogizes the 1i to Mao's Four Articles of
Discipline, 78 intended to guide the Party and the nation. Under the
Four Articles, the elite is omnipotent and grants rights to individuals
according to a predetermined hierarchy.' 79 This structure is reflected
in the 1982 Constitution currently in force.
C. Government
The ultimate goal of the Confucian system was order and har-
mony, the road to which was paved by the 1i and filial piety. The duty
of the emperor toward his subjects was to hold all authority, foster
moral virtue, and educate by example. It was the duty of the subject
qua son to show undaunting respect and to cultivate his own morality.
The emperor was the father of the kingdom and the head of the Chi-
nese family. Through these principles, a humane ruler could foster
universal love and affection throughout the realm.
In the West, social contract theory served to legitimize govern-
ments. While there are various justifications for it, the "contract"
amounted to the people ceding power to a government, so that it
would rule for the benefit of all. Although the extent and form of
powers and rights given over to a sovereign varied among social con-
tract theorists, all placed limitations upon the ruling body's power at
some point. i80
There was no social contract between the people and the govern-
ment in imperial China. Chinese emperors were legitimized by a man-
date from heaven, and theoretically worked towards harmony with the
people. They served as the link between the heavens above and the
subjects below, and administered heaven's mandate in the best interest
of their subjects. When a ruler was overthrown, it was explained sim-
177. See generally HELEN F. SlO, AGENTS AND VICTIMS IN SOUTH CHINA (1989). Siu's
ethnography reveals the changes in social and economic institutions in several villages in south-
ern China from the imperial period to the late 1980s, and concludes that long-repressed tradi-
tional relationships have begun to resurface.
178. These are (1) the individual is subordinate to the organization; (2) the minority is
subordinate to the majority; (3) the lower level is subordinate to the higher level; and (4) the
entire membership is subordinate to the Central Committee. Wenxiang, supra note 173, at 370
(citing MAO'S QUOTATIONS 255).
179. Id. at 369-71.
180. See generally LUKES, supra note 12, at 79-81.
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ply that he' had lost the mandate through immoral rule - by not act-
ing in the best interest of his subjects. The emperor was the exemplar
of humanity to which the masses could aspire, who served the needs of
his subjects to create a harmonious atmosphere and maintain heaven's
blessing.
The central government's primary moral role of fostering human-
ity by cultivating the moral growth of its subjects was achieved
through formal and informal education. This fosterage role was per-
formed by various levels of government. At the local level, village el-
ders and local scholar-officials educated the villagers that were too
poor to attend a Confucian academy, usually by giving sermons on
filial piety, chastity, and compassion. Families of means would send a
child to an academy to be formally educated in the Confucian classics.
After completing that course of study, the student would sit for the
grueling imperial examinations in hopes of becoming a government
official, the elite of society.' 8 '
The emperor, village elders, and scholar-officials served as models
for educating the people. 182 This practice can be traced back as far as
the Han dynasty 18 3 (206 B.C.-220 A.D.), and is still in use today. The
use of models brings about a certain standardization and harmony that
is consistent with the Chinese view that society is a seamless web,
whose strands must all be of the same length in order to fit into a
preordained pattern. 1 4 Nonstandard threads weaken and disfigure
the web. A nonstandard thread must be repaired or removed in the
greater interest of society.
The idea that a nonstandard thread can be repaired reflects the
concept that people are changeable and "perfectible" through the de-
velopment of their social nature by means of fosterage and educa-
tion. 18 5 This fosterage practice continues today. The Party, as the
voice of the proletariat, attempts to elicit certain behavior from and
instill certain beliefs in the masses. This is done through education
and ,moral inculcation that aims at cultivating a certain moral and so-
cial character. Using models to educate and motivate the masses is a
mainstay of the Chinese communists, as exemplified by the prop-
agandistic use of the model Dazhai Brigade, various model students,
181. For a detailed account of the means and vast extent of social advancement through
education in China, see MUNRO, supra note 172, at 93-97.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 136. Confucius said, "When gentlemen deal generously with their own kin, the
common people are incited to goodness." CONFUCIUS, supra note 175, bk. 8:2.
184. Edwards, supra note 73, at 41, 44.
185. MUNRO, supra note 172, at 84.
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workers, peasants, party members, and in countless other campaigns
of appraisal by comparison.'8 6
The fosterage role is best exemplified by the socialist model of the
mass line, or democratic centralism, employed by the Party. As Don-
ald Munro points out, this policy emulates the human learning pro-
cess, wherein a person first produces perceptions of external things,
then conceptualizes and theorizes about them, and finally applies the
theories in practice. The process is repeated and refined, each time
increasing the "truth value" of the theory. 8 7 The mass line policy
translates this cognitive process into the group setting. The leaders
interact with the masses and absorb perceptions from them, then dis-
cuss and reflect on what they have learned, resulting in a theory. The
theory is returned to the masses to be taught, practiced, and revised.
The process is repeated and refined to higher levels of truth. In this
role, the leaders act as the masses' brain, performing the conceptual-
ization function. When the theory is returned to the masses, the edu-
cation produces changes in the people's social nature. Thus, through
education, the socialist government continues to play a fostering role.
D. The Legal System
The emphasis on harmony in society did not foster the develop-
ment of a Western-style, rights-oriented legal system. Confucian an-
tipathy toward law stemmed from the belief that if the people knew
exactly what the law was, they would find ways around it to avoid
penalties, and ultimately lose their sense of shame. 188 The political
system relied on sincerity, moral virtue, and a spirit of harmony in-
stead of any clearly defined law. '8 9 There was a belief that laws made
people more litigious and detracted from moral education. The com-
pletion of China's earliest known legal codes, between 536 B.C. and
501 B.C., inspired a well-known protest letter from a diplomat of a
neighboring state:
Originally, sir, I had hope in you, but now that is all over. Anciently,
the early kings conducted their administration by deliberating on mat-
ters [as they arose,] they did not put their punishments and penalties
[into writing], fearing that this would create a contentiousness among
the people which could not be checked. Therefore they used the princi-
ple of social rightness (yi) to keep the people in bounds, held them to-
gether through their administrative procedures, activated for them the
accepted ways of behavior (10, maintained good faith (xin) toward them,
186. See, e.g., id. at 138-39.
187. Id. at 98-99.
188. See CONFUCIUS, supra note 175, bk. 2:3.
189. BODDE, supra note 159, at 162.
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and presented them with [examples of] benevolence (ren) .... But when
the people know what the penalties are, they lose their fear of authority
and acquire a contentiousness which causes them to make their appeal to
the written words [of penal laws], on the chance that this will bring them
success [in court cases] .... As soon as the people know the grounds on
which to conduct disputation, they will reject the [unwritten] accepted
ways of behavior (h) and make their appeal to the written word, arguing
to the last over the tip of an awl or a knife. Disorderly litigations will
multiply and bribery will become current.1tg
Thus, government by law was rejected in favor of government by vir-
tue.' 9 t The virtues of conciliation, harmony, and obedience resulted
in the subordination of individual interests to the interests of the
greater society, and restrained the development of a rights-conscious
legal system. 192
This informal method of conflict resolution largely remains today,
carrying forward the traditional conceptions of rights it embodies.1 93
There was some effort at developing formal codes and procedures in
the twentieth century during the Republican era and during the early
Communist period,1 94 but these efforts were cut short when Western-
ized legal experts were purged in the anti-rightist campaign of the late
1950s. The Communists tried to make law simpler and more accessi-
ble to the masses. 95 However, that effort was overshadowed by their
distrust of the rule of law.196 The "rule of man," utilizing traditional
methods of behavioral control, persuasion, and education by conscien-
tious officials, was preferable to them. 97 Nearly all disputes are still
settled in "friendly mediation" among the parties, often by neighbor-
hood committees, a police agency, or other official and quasiofficial
bodies. 198
Recent outbreaks of crime and corruption, however, have con-
vinced Chinese leaders of the need to develop its legal institutions and
body of law. In 1979, the first comprehensive criminal and procedure
codes were completed. 199 There are now schools attempting to fill the
190. Written by a dignitary from Shu Xiang, a neighboring state. Id. at 177-78 (translation).
191. Li, supra note 72, at 13.
192. See Edwards, supra note 73, at.42.
193. See, e.g., Li Maoguan, Why Laws Go Unenforced, 32 BEUING REV., Sept 18-24, 1989, at
7.
194. Li, supra note 72, at 20.
195. Id. at 31.
196. Id. at 24-25.
197. Id. at 25-26.
198. See id. at 69; Edwards, supra note 73, at 46.
199. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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severe shortage of judges and to train court personnel, 20° and there
appears to be some effort towards regularizing the legal process. Un-
fortunately, this ray of hope was shadowed when the predominance of
politics over rights was, once again, reaffirmed by the secret trials and
other violations of the June 4 Tiananmen Square "counterrevolutiona-
ries" human rights. Such episodes reminded the world how deeply
entrenched are the traditional concepts of the State's complete author-
ity and subservience of the individual.
III. NATURAL RIGHTS ARE NOT THE ANSWER
The universalists argue that there is no need for cultural under-
standing of the basis of human rights; such rights already exist natu-
rally and simply need to be observed. This Part reveals why an
argument premised on natural rights theory will fail to be accepted in
China.
A. Marxist Critique of Rights
Because China is a Marxist-Leninist state, it is imperative to un-
derstand the socialist conception of rights. Marx rejected the notion
of natural individual rights and considered them tools of the capitalist
class used only to seduce the proletariat and to further bourgeois
goals. It is the object of this study to find a place for human rights and
law in a socialist State.
Marx's scattered writings on the subject of rights reveal his convic-
tion against the notion that a just society has an obligation to protect
natural human rights. In his Critique of the Gotha Program Marx crit-
icized fair distribution and its implicit call for equal rights:
I have dealt with.., equal right [and] fair distribution... in order to
[avoid perversion of] the realistic outlook, which it cost so much effort to
instil [sic] into the Party but which has now taken root in it, by means of
ideological nonsense about rights and other trash so common among the
democrats and French Socialists. 20 1
Marx believed that rights were a bourgeois invention for maintain-
ing its own class goals, and, as such, were an ineffective tool for
achieving socialism. 202 Christine Sypnowich suggests that Marx was
"condemning not rights per se but the tendency of some revolution-
aries to fiddle with capitalist distribution arrangements instead of
200. Ren Jianxin Stresses Educating Court Personnel, F.B.I.S. DAILY REPORT CHINA, Aug.
27, 1990, at 18.
201. Marx, supra note 62, at 531.
202. Id. at 530-31.
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overthrowing capitalist relations of production. ' 20 3 Marx held that
rights were the means utilized by the bourgeoisie to legitimize the cap-
italist order and he maintained that only a complete eradication of
capitalist institutions would truly set the proletariat free.2°4
The Chinese have adopted the Marxist view that human rights in
capitalist society are merely a tool for protecting bourgeois property
interests20 5 and their inequalities. 2°6 A Chinese writer has summed up
the Marxist conception of natural human rights as "surface equality
[concealing] an essence of inequality .... Under the disguise of equal-
ity, they try by every possible means to nullify the rights of the work-
ing people, thus ensuring their own privileges. ' 20 7
Natural law is troublesome for Marxists because of the questiona-
ble morality that the law codifies. The problem lies in the "natural
lawyer's attempt to offer a moral standard that transcends the different
moral situations which may arise in a society," 20 8 as well as those
found in various cultures with different historical legacies. Marx be-
lieved that morality is formed by historical circumstances, and, there-
fore, until communism is achieved, there can never be any universal
morality transcending time, culture, and historical influences. Marx
indicated that "rights can never be higher than the economic structure
of society and its cultural development conditioned thereby." 2°9
To a Marxist, the idea of individual rights implies a society
wherein each member's purpose is naturally opposed to the interests of
others: "a society incurably torn asunder by the clash of private
aspirations. '210
None of the supposed rights of man.., go beyond the egoistic man, man
as he is, as a member of civil society; that is, an individual separated
from the community, withdrawn into himself, wholly preoccupied with
his interest and acting in accordance with his private caprice .... The
only bond between men [within the individual rights framework] is natu-
ral necessity, need and private interest, the preservation of their property
and their egoistic persons.211
203. CHRISTINE SYPNOWICH, THE CONCEPT OF SOCIALIST LAW 88 (1990).
204. Marx, supra note 62, at 531.
205. Marx, On the Jewish Question, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER, supra note 62, at 62,
43.
206. Radio Talk Views Socialist, Capitalist Rights, F.B.I.S. DAILY REPORT CHINA, Sept. 26,
1989, at 28.
207. What Are Socialist Human Rights?, F.B.I.S. DAILY REPORT CHINA, Aug. 29, 1989, at
24.
208. SYPNOWICH, supra note 203, at 31.
209. Marx, supra note 62, at 531.
210. Leszek Kolakowski, Marxism and Human Rights, 81 DAEDALUS, Fall 1983, at 84.
211. Marx, supra note 205, at 43.
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In this light, rights had a very limited role in socialist society.
Marxists saw law as a barrier between the classes built by the bour-
geoisie for the purpose of maintaining its domination over the proleta-
riat. Marx viewed capitalist society as being unnaturally divided into
the civil society and the State; bourgeois and proletariat; private and
public. Law protects the private egoistic interests, which are unique to
capitalist societies. It is not an expression of the collective morality,
but, as a mediator of private disputes, it protects private interests.
In the pre-Communist stage of socialist development, law is a tool
of the State in its role as the embodiment of the proletariet. It is a tool
for suppressing remaining bourgeois elements in order to safeguard
socialist goals.212 In this society, capitalists will have no rights under
the law.
After the socialist revolution removes all traces of capitalist rela-
tions, individual and community interests will become as one.213 The
need for law will subside, only to be replaced by "elemental rules of
social intercourse, ' 214 which all will follow without coercion. Fur-
thermore, the theory follows, there would be no need for law to serve
its function as the regulator of scarce resources. Under communism,
society simply will not need law and it will wither away.
The utopian socialist vision is not without its shortcomings. First
of all, this vision is still but an unrecognized aspiration. Contempo-
rary socialist societies have recognized the need for law in their pre-
communist stages of development. 215 As Sypnowich points out, this
position ignores the possibility of disputes arising between individuals
that are not class-based or egoistic. 21 6 Accordingly, there would be
some role for law in a socialist order. After all, if law provides, to
some degree, an expression of the moral values of a capitalist society,
why, then, can it not do the same for a classless society?
B. Other Critiques of the Natural Rights Solution
Legal positivists agree with the Marxists' rejection of the natural
rights picture of a natural universal morality. Positivists argue that
law and rights arise only from institutions, and ask what relevance
rights could have prior to society, since only social and political stric-
tures can infringe upon them. Positivists insist that rights must be
212. 2 LENIN, supra note 63, at 292-98.
213. Id. at 292-93.
214. Id. at 199, 292.
215. See supra parts II(B)(2)-(3).
216. SYPNOWICH, supra note 203, at 8.
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facts that are ascertainable through a rational process, and 'find no
method of determining which rights exist outside of the law. It fol-
lows that if law does not allow for a right in society, it cannot exist
elsewhere. H.L.A. Hart maintains that "without government and law,
men have no rights and can have none. '2 1 7 Margaret MacDonald
asks, "[W]hat kind of rights are unwritten, need never have been en-
acted, and can be unobserved without penalty?" 218 Jeremy Bentham
claimed that only positive law could bestow rights and colorfully
phrased his objections to natural rights as follows:
[T]here are no such things as natural rights - no such things as rights
anterior to the establishment of government - no such things as natural
rights opposed to, in contradistinction to, legal: that the expression is
merely figurative; that when used, in the moment you attempt to give it a
literal meaning it leads to error, and to that sort of error that leads to
mischief - to the extremity of mischief .... That which has no exist-
ence cannot be destroyed - that which cannot be destroyed cannot re-
quire anything to preserve it from destruction. Natural rights is simple
nonsense: natural and imprescriptable rights, rhetorical nonsense, -
nonsense upon stilts.2 19
Utilitarians like Bentham believed that a natural rights ideology would
lead to anarchy. 220 The immutable nature of natural rights could re-
strict the ability of the government to take measures furthering the
general welfare, which is the guiding force for utilitarian public policy
and moral decisions. Utilitarianism cannot allow any individual inter-
est, natural or otherwise, to detract from maximization of the public
good.
The Communitarian Alasdair MacIntyre agrees with the legal
positivists that rights cannot be considered to exist outside of society
and can only be found in law. He holds that "the truth is plain there
are no such rights, and belief in them is one with the belief in witches
and in unicorns," because every attempt to believe in natural rights
has failed for an inability to demonstrate their existence. 22 1 MacIntyre
points out that twentieth century natural rights thinkers appeal to our
intuitions to explain natural rights, and reasons that "the introduction
of the word 'intuition' by a moral philosopher is always a signal that
217. H.L.A. Hart, Utilitarianism and Natural Rights, reprinted in ESSAYS IN JURISPRU-
DENCE AND PHILOSOPHY, at 181, 182 (1983).
218. Margaret MacDonald, Natural Rights, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 21, 22 (Jeremy Wal-
dron ed., 1984).
219. Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies, in HUMAN RIGHTS 28, 31-32 (A.I. Melden ed.,
1970).
220. Id.
221. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 69 (2d ed.
1984).
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something has gone badly wrong with an argument. ' 222 He concludes
that natural rights are a fallacy based on the false conception of the
independent individual as free from subservience to community
authority. 223
Beyond the strong criticisms posed by the positivists, utilitarians,
and communitarians, differing explanations of the content of natural
rights cast further doubt on the theory. The content of "immutable"
natural law has actually undergone significant changes over time, rais-
ing questions about its eternal nature. While natural law was articu-
lated in the New Testament, its use as a political theory is relatively
recent. It made its first concrete appearance in this form in the Decla-
ration of the French Constituent Assembly and the rise of social con-
tract theory.224 It was during the bourgeois revolutions that natural
rights came to be viewed as the protectors of property, equality, and
freedom. In the twentieth century, the definition of natural rights has
broadened to include a right to social welfare and employment, 225 or a
right to property, 226 or Dworkinian equality and justice in the distri-
bution of goods.227 While Dworkin admits that natural rights are not
demonstrable, he says that it does not follow that they can be proven
to be untrue.228 This may be logically appealing, but it casts a shadow
of doubt over the theory.
C. Past Failures of Natural Rights in China
In the past, Chinese intellectuals have attempted to adapt natural
rights theory to China and failed. 229 Natural rights were first im-
ported into China near the end of the Qing Dynasty by Yan Fu and
Liang Qichao. Yan Fu taught Western ideas, such as suppressing gov-
ernment while exalting the people.230 After the Hundred Days Re-
form in 1898, Liang's writings taught that humans had innate rights
endowed by nature, or "heaven." ' 23' These ideas became widely ac-
cepted in intellectual circles, despite - or because of - their frontal
assault on traditional hierarchical structures. There were calls for a
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
225. See. e.g., Universal Declaration, supra note 1, arts. 22, 23 & 25.
226. Id.
227. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272-73 (1978).
228. Id. at 69-70.
229. For a discussion of Chinese natural rights in traditional China, see He, supra note 137,
at 8.
230. Id. at 16.
231. Id. at 17.
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parliamentary government by leaders such as Sun Yatsen, Huang
Xing, and Song Jiaoren, the latter paying for it with his life.232 De-
mocracy, as one of the "Three People's Principles," was written into
the 1913 Provisional Constitution. 233 While such reforms were writ-
ten on paper, they were never actually realized in Chinese society.
The weight of tradition was simply too heavy to allow the new theory
to become Sinicized during its twenty or thirty years of existence,
prior to being banished by the one party system of the Nationalist
Government (Guomindang).234
Had it been allowed to survive, it is unlikely that China's flirtation
with natural rights theory would have grown to imitate Kantian atom-
ism as it existed in the West. Whenever natural rights have been ex-
tolled in China, they have taken on uniquely Chinese features.
Kantian theory emphasizes the value of the individual as an independ-
ent autonomous entity; humans are considered objective ends in them-
selves. In China, natural rights theory always supported a collective
purpose for the individual. Natural rights and individualism were per-
ceived by Chinese intellectuals as the cornerstone of Western strength,
and it was thought that adopting these principles would make China
strong and wealthy. The Hundred Days Reform, the May Fourth
Movement, and the December Ninth Movement were all occasions
where individual natural rights and democratic values were invoked to
save the country from the threat of destruction - a collective pur-
pose. 235 In Kantian terms, this placed the rights-endowed individual
in the role of a "means" towards a greater end - national salvation -
making individual rights secondary to State interests.
In sum, Western natural rights grew out of the oppression of indi-
viduals and were invoked to make the State a means toward the ends
of protecting the individual. In China, natural rights were expected to
strengthen the individual, who would then provide a means for pro-
tecting the State.
Another reason for the failure of natural rights to be absorbed into
Chinese culture is the great weight of thousands of years of Confucian
collectivism. In the Confucian society, the Five Cardinal Relation-
ships shaped people's identities. 236 Individuals took on their identity
232. Id. at 18.
233. Article 12 stated that "[t]he people have the right to vote and to be candidates for
office." Andrew J. Nathan, Political Rights in Chinese Constitutions, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CON-
TEMPORARY CHINA, supra note 44, at 87.
234. He, supra note 137, at 18-20.
235. Id. at 20-22.
236. See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
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in accordance with their relationships to the people around them.
Parent-child, husband-wife, ruler-subject, or friend-friend: every rela-
tionship had predetermined rules of ritual and filial piety. It was vir-
tuous for the individual to subordinate his or her own personal
inclinations and feelings and submit to the demands of filial piety and
the li in order to enhance harmony and social welfare for every-
body. 237 This sentiment is expressed in the Chinese proverb "every-
thing under heaven is for the public" (tian xia wei gong).
Simply importing foreign ideas into China and writing them down
on paper will not impart them to that ancient society. He Zhaowu
highlights two examples of how resistant China is to absorbing foreign
traditions.238 First, Indian Buddhism was introduced into China dur-
ing the Eastern Han dynasty, but did not become Sinicized until the
Tang dynasty, at least 800 years later. Second, the Jesuits were teach-
ing Western religion and ideology in China for 200 years, from the
late-Ming period to the mid-Qing dynasty. Very little of the Jesuit
teaching had any significant lasting impact. Comparatively, the idea
of natural rights had been in China for less than one hundred years,
and was allowed to freely develop for only about thirty years - hardly
enough time for a seedling to take root and bloom in such hostile and
impenetrable soil. Even given endless time, the weight of Confucian
and collectivistic culture would likely prove to be insurmountable.
IV. SOCIETY-BASED RIGHTS
As we have seen, it is unlikely that natural rights theory would be
adopted by the Chinese Communist Party or integrated into the cul-
ture. Such a transformation would require a fundamental change in
the Chinese self-image and the way they have viewed their society for
thousands of years. Futhermore, the Marxists, legal positivists, and
communitarians have offered convincing critiques of the theory. How-
ever, discarding the source of a right does not invalidate the existence
of that right. An alternative source of human rights may be found-
one that conforms to Confucian collectivism and socialism.
The object of human rights is to protect the intrinsic value of
human beings, or human dignity.239 Various cultures and philoso-
phies define this unique human worth - this humanity - differently.
Chinese Confucianism and socialism mutually reject Western concep-
tions of presocietal "natural" dignity,24° arguing that dignity must be
237. See supra Part III(B)(2).
238. He, supra note 137, at 20-21.
239. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
240. See supra Parts III(A) and (B).
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rooted in society and be subject to historical development. 24' In Chi-
nese society, human dignity derives from the human capacity to en-
gage in fundamental relationships, the most fundamental relationships
being those within the family. 242 Thus, in China dignity is derived
from society, and hence is subject to historical forces. 243
A few examples will demonstrate how human rights, and the dig-
nity they protect, change over time and vary according to social condi-
tions, demonstrating that dignity is a historical subject. Today there is
a human right to private property. 2 " In tribal and community-ori-
ented feudal systems, land frequently belonged to the community, in
the sense that ownership carried with it certain obligations to the col-
lective for its preservation and use. Land ownership was a form of
trust.245 In Western liberal society, property has come to be consid-
ered capital, and the right to own and use property freely is a constitu-
ent of human dignity. A right to property "presupposes a series of
social conventions which render the privatization of resources a seem-
ingly 'natural' thing to do.' 246 Human rights have evolved within the
Western world as well. The right of freedom has expanded from its
original U.S. application to only white males, to include freedom from
slavery for blacks. 247 The rights of equality and property have come
to mean suffrage and property ownership for women. 248  We are now
seeing the evolution of a right to die, 249 a right to economic develop-
ment, 250 and many others. As new protections of human dignity arise
with the creation of new rights, it is apparent that the content of
human dignity changes over time, and is not "natural," constant, or
eternal.
Two additional aspects of human rights and dignity lend support
to the conclusion that they are products of society. First, the act of
241. This Part adapts a scheme for socialist rights to the Chinese situation. See SYPNOWICH,
supra note 203.
242. See infra Part III(B).
243. See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text..
244. The two most significant recent international instruments delineating human rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360, and the International Convenant on Civil and Political
Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368, do not include a
right to private property due to the objections of socialist nations. However, the 1982 Constitu-
tion does include a right to property. 1982 CoNSTITUTION art. 13.
245. SYPNOWICH, supra note 203, at 102.
246. Id. (citing Hillel Steiner, Natural Right to the Means of Production, 27 PHIL. Q. (1977)).
247. U.S. CONST amend. XIII.
248. See, e.g., U.S. CONsT. amend XIX.
249. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
250. See, e.g., Universal Declaration, supra note 1, at 21-29.
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asserting a right is an admission of membership in a community. Indi-
viduals possess rights only by participation in society, and thus, soci-
ety engenders the qualities of human dignity.251 Second, it is only in
society that individuals can come to recognize the moral compulsion
of rights. Through our membership in the collective we become aware
of the need to treat each other with equality and concern, thus recog-
nizing the value of asserting and respecting human rights.252 There is
no reason that a useful doctrine of socialist human rights cannot take
shape.
V. THE SOLUTION: GUARANTEED RIGHTS
Guaranteeing human rights is not a luxury, it is a necessity. Con-
trary to the Chinese leaders' apparent opinion that human rights pose
a threat to the central power of the Party and State, such rights are
actually ideally suited for China's current domestic and international
condition. As this section will show, guaranteeing human rights will
assist in building socialism and a strong State, while helping to im-
prove China's foreign political and trade relations. True protection of
human rights, without which there can never be full economic and
social development, is essential for preserving the Chinese people's
dignity and self-realization. Guaranteeing individuals the opportunity
to fulfill their respective capacities is fundamental to the socialist sys-
tem. It is those human capacities, so stifled by the capitalist relations
to production, that socialism seeks to set free. This requires allowing
the people to think and express themselves freely, without fear of arbi-
trary or political reprisal.
A. Freedom of Thought and Expression Enhances
Basic Relationships
The primary social unit in Chinese society is the family.253 The
relationships between an individual and the community or the State
take on many of the same characteristics as those within the family.
For these relationships to develop fully, they must be based on truth.
If people are afraid of persecution for stating what they genuinely per-
ceive and feel, there is no basis for learning from facts. Working from
a basis of truth is not only essential for policymakers, it is vital for
251. See Charles Taylor, Atomism, in POWERS, POSSESSIONS AND FREEDOMS 39 (Alkis
Kontos ed., 1979).
252. SYPNOWICH, supra note 203, at 106-07.
253. See supra notes 136-44 and accompanying text.
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strong relations among individuals and between the State and its
citizens.
Freedom of expression is necessary for strong family bonds. Dur-
ing the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and '70s, it became common-
place for overzealous children to turn in their parents and teachers to
the Red Guards on charges of being "capitalist roaders. ' ' 254 This cre-
ated an aura of mistrust and apprehension in millions of households,
within society's most basic unit: the family. Without respect and filial
piety, first learned at home, there was no respect among young people
for other societal institutions such as schools and government agen-
cies. Mao's encouragement of tearing down the bonds of filial loyalty
and respect, forces that had brought harmony to Chinese society for
thousands of years, wreaked political and societal havoc.
The extreme example of the Cultural Revolution is a magnification
of the more subtle, but equally destructive, forces that continue to
work in the Chinese household today. If family members cannot ex-
press their true thoughts, feelings, and desires, they are forced to lie to
one another. Lying breeds distrust, disrespect, and even contempt,
thereby destroying the basis of respect and authority in the home,
without which there is no filial piety. Filial piety proyides order and
harmony in the home and collective society. Yet this humanizing force
- this primary source of dignity - is smothered without freedom to
express the truth free from fear of reprisal.
Guaranteed freedom of expression is also necessary for the govern-
ment to carry out its historical role. Effective utilization of the mass
line principle requires gathering the purest possible perceptions from
the masses on which to build theories. 255 In the absence of guaranteed
freedom of thought and speech, the people are forced to withhold or
censor their true perceptions when informing the government. It is
self-defeating for the government to restrict these freedoms, while at
the same time seeking out truth from the mass line policy. In order
for people to freely articulate their thoughts and feelings, they must be
free from fear of being prosecuted as a counterrevolutionary.
To create better policy and stronger societal bonds, certain rights
such as assembly, free speech, and a free press must be guaranteed. In
order to be meaningful, they must be granted equally to all people,
enforced by an independent judiciary, and not be subject to suspension
by the Party. If China's leaders intend to build socialism by use of the
254. For a groundbreaking sociological study revealing the destructive intrafamily forces un-
leashed by the Cultural Revolution, see DAVID M. RADDOCK, POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF ADO-
LESCENTS IN CHINA (1977).
255. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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mass line, making these rights enforceable against the government by
all citizens will assist in this effort.
Currently, all criticism of the socialist State and Party is consid-
ered to be a violation of the Five Cardinal Principles in the 1982 Con-
stitution.256 Guaranteeing the rights of free expression will thus
require a reinterpretation of the 1982 Constitution, yet freedom of ex-
pression can now be seen to contribute towards strengthening the
State by making the mass line policy far more effective. The family
unit will also be strengthened, allowing it to provide stronger gui-
dance, and instilling honest respect for and faith in the collective as a
positive force. This can only further harmonize relations within soci-
ety. Naturally, not all of the opinions voiced will robotically echo the
Party line, but they can all be considered constitutionally sound and
contributory to socialism by providing truth to policymakers.
B. Strengthening the Basic Relationships Sets the
People's Capacities Free
In his Communist Manifesto and Das Kapital, Marx repeatedly
said that the free development of each individual is a requirement for
the free development of all people.257 Strengthening the basic societal
relationships will assist individuals in realizing their full capacities,
one of socialism's most important aspirations.
As Wang Ruoshui has pointed out, Marxists divide the develp-
ment of people's needs into three stages: existence, comfort, and devel-
opment.258 The Chinese experience has borne Marx's theory out on
this issue. The first problem for the newly victorious Chinese Commu-
nists was to keep their people alive. The government focused on meet-
ing the basic material needs for the masses' continued existence,
making sure that people were housed, fed, and healthy. As the means
for meeting people's existence became more sophisticated, people's
needs were also raised to a higher level. These historical forces drove
people into the comfort stage of needs development. 259 People wanted
attractive clothing, tasty food, and comfortable surroundings, not just
life-sustaining gruel, simple clothes, and a roof over their heads. 26°
Beyond simple material enjoyment, human beings crave spiritual
256. Discussed supra note 121 and accompanying text.
257. See, e.g., THE MARX-ENGELS READER, supra note 62, at 294, 473.
258. On the Marxist Philosophy of Man, F.B.I.S. DAILY REPORT CHINA, July 23, 1986, at
K7, 11 (part one) [hereinafter Marxist Philosophy Part 1].
259. On the Marxist Philosophy of Man, F.B.I.S. DAILY REPORT CHINA, July 24, 1986, at
KI (part two) [hereinafter Marxist Philosophy Part I].
260. Id. at K2.
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enjoyment. All people have the natural capacity to increase their level
of spiritual development. This is expressed in the development stage
of needs, in the individual's desire to develop himself or herself.261
Material gain is merely used by humanity, but creativity and spiritual
fulfillment develop the very essence of the human being. Wisdom, in-
telligence, and creativity are, in part, what sets humans apart from the
animal kingdom. Developing those faculties drives humans towards
fulfilling their human potential - this is self-realization. Marx's "free
development of man" refers to "the complete and free development of
man's potential and man's realization of himself. ' 262
People naturally seek to develop themselves spiritually. 263 This
goes beyond political and economic development and enters the
worlds of artistic endeavor, intellectual pursuit, the satisfaction of a
job well done, contributions made to one's fellows, or the simple joys
of time spent with one's family. These are needs unique to humans as
social beings whose requirements are various and continuously chang-
ing as society develops.
Spiritual development is the pursuit of cultivating humanity. Lim-
iting human pursuits to the economic or ideological spheres, as the
Chinese government has done in the past, stifles the people's spiritual
growth and hinders full development for all.264 According to Marx,
allowing the people to fully participate in all that society has to offer-
a virtually endless list, including work, education, relationships, cul-
ture - is a requirement for each individual's free development, and
thus is the condition for the free development of all.265 In Communist
society, public and personal interests coincide, but one does not re-
place the other.
Building socialism is not simply an economic endeavor; its ulti-
mate purpose is to satisfy peoples' needs.266 People are the primary
force of production, driving development and modernization. As his-
tory unfolds, the people will modernize themselves, "realizing their
own value while making contributions to society," 267 and will ulti-
mately be set free.
261. Marxist Philosophy Part I, supra note 258, at K13.
262. Id.
263. See Marxist Philosophy Part II, supra note 259, at KI-2.
264. Id. at KI.
265. Marxist Philosophy Part I, supra note 258, at K8.
266. Id. at K7. This has been stated by the 3d Plenary Session of the 22d Chinese Commu-
nist Party Central Committee. Marxist Philosophy Part II, supra note 259, at KI.
267. Marxist Philospohy Part II, supra note 259, at K8.
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C. What Rights?
In the framework provided by the current Chinese political and
legal structure, certain rights must be legally guaranteed in order for
the Chinese people to be set free. These basic rights will not necessi-
tate a dramatic alteration of the political system, nor be costly to put
into place.
1. Freedom of Thought and Expression
Freedom of thought and expression are not only necessary for indi-
vidual self-fulfillment and the government's fosterage role, but should
also play a part in China's electoral process. Providing candidates
that are selected without the input of the voters denies the people of a
genuine voice in the election process, removing them from actual par-
ticipation in their own development. If elections are held, the people
must be free to genuinely express themselves in these political func-
tions. Such expression will more accurately convey to the Party the
sentiments of the masses, as expressed in the ballot, and allow the peo-
ple to become further self-realized through their genuinely meaningful
participation in these community affairs.
2. Due Process
By becoming a party to the various international instruments, 268
China has endorsed and agreed to implement specific rights to safe-
guard human dignity. We have seen that dignity is derived from par-
ticipation in the basic relationships with the family and the
community. Removing an individual from his or her basic relation-
ships strips that person of his or her dignity and humanity;269 there-
fore, before weakening society's "cornerstone" by removing one of its
component parts, all measures must be taken to insure that the person
is deserving of such a fate. This cannot be ensured when the zealous
policeman and prosecutor also act as the judge and jury.
Due process requires developing concise and meaningful codes.
People must be aware of the bounds of the law in order to avoid over-
stepping them. A law is not meaningful if it can be abrogated by cer-
tain elements in society. In order for human dignity to prosper and
the people to become self-realized, all elements of society must be free
to participate in relationships within the bounds of fair and equal laws.
Due process cannot be guaranteed in the shadow of constitutionally
mandated inequality of rights.
268. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 66-79 and accompanying text.
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This right begins, but does not end, in the judicial sector. Due
process requires fair hearings before an impartial tribunal, including
the right to defense counsel and the means to prepare and present a
defense. Additionally, it dictates that a presumption of innocence
guide the proceedings. It is only by these means that the dignity of the
Chinese individual can be guaranteed and that he or she can fully
develop.
Due process protects the rights of the accused until he or she is
determined guilty in a fair and impartial manner;270 it protects society
as well. When an innocent person is convicted, not only does the real
guilty party go free, but society is minus one innocent contributor. It
also suffers in a less tangible, but more costly fashion: knowledge that
there is no recourse to protect against false or erroneous charges in-
stills a quiet chill, indeed a subtle terror, in the public at large. Due
process guarantees will reduce the resulting antagonism and fear be-
tween the authorities and the citizens, leading to more cooperation
and harmony.
3. Procedural Regulations
Procedural regulations are necessary to effectuate the rights spelled
out in the 1982 Constitution. To be effective, these rights must be
guaranteed equally to all people and enforceable against the govern-
ment. This is not possible without implementing procedures to en-
force violations of these rights in each and every case. China has made
a meager regulatory attempt at providing some measure of human
rights by promulgating the Human Rights Regulations, 271 which em-
ploy a problematic two-tier concept of law and enforcement. The
Regulations are the second tier, and determine which violations of the
first tier laws, such as the Criminal Code, are worthy of actual enforce-
ment by investigation and prosecution. The better method would be
to enforce the values expressed in the first tier laws - the Constitu-
tion, the legal codes, and regulations - uniformly and without excep-
tion. The present political and legal system, in which rights are highly
politicized, does not allow for uniform enforcement of the law or guar-
anteed protection of rights.272 Inequality of rights introduces a degree
of arbitrariness into the legal system that undermines the rights of
everyone.
Equality before the law requires equality between individuals as
270. Universal Declaration, supra note 1, art. 10.
271. See supra Part I(B)(3).
272. See supra Parts I(B)(l)-(2).
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well as between citizens and government agencies. Administrative
agencies must be guided by procedural regulations that clearly inform
the public and the bureaucrats of their respective rights and limita-
tions. The authority to determine when those lines have been trans-
gressed must be exercised by an independent and neutral body. To
place it in the hands of the very agency accused of violating those rules
reduces enforcement to the point of farce.
The Human Rights Regulations point out that human rights con-
cerns are only raised when a State and its citizens are at odds. Protect-
ing those rights gives the people a voice that is indispensible to the
State's fosterage role. Human rights allow the masses to scrutinize
political decisions and to hasten historical development by exceeding
the boundaries of Chinese society's existing realities and practices.
D. International Benefits
On the international plane, bringing China into line with its legal
human rights obligations will result in international economic and
political benefits. While China has proven to be relatively impervious
to international political pressure, it has suffered economically, adding
to its people's burden. Following the events in Tiananmen Square on
June 4, 1989, the Western world reacted with strong condemnation
and suspended many economic and technology transfer agreements.
In July, 1989, the Group of Seven industrialized nations, comprised of
the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, France, Japan, Canada,
and Germany, issued a joint declaration condemning the Chinese gov-
ernment's actions.273 Japan, the World Bank, and the Asian Develop-
ment Bank suspended various aid and loan programs to China. While
most of these restrictions have been softened or lifted in the years
since,274 the sanctions were undoubtedly felt in China's economy and
caused a setback to economic modernization.
On the political front, it was only through tough political arm-
twisting that China was able to narrowly avert a strong condemnation
by the United Nations - a serious embarrassment for a permanent
member of the Security Council. The U.N. Human Rights Subcom-
mission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minor-
ities passed a resolution that listed China as a serious violator of
international human rights law including, inter alia, violations of the
273. See Maureen Dowd, Leaders at Summit Back Financial Aid for East Europe, N.Y.
TIMES, July 16, 1989, Sec. 1, at 1.
274. N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1990, at A3, China Wins Two Loans; Export-Import Bank, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 6, 1991, at DI; Japanese Release Aid, N.Y. TIMES, March 21, 1991, at D7.
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right to life and the right to be free from torture.275 The U.N. Com-
mission on Human Rights narrowly defeated the resolution by a vote
of 17 to 15, along East-West lines, 27 6 which prevented the resolution
from being sent on to the General Assembly for approval. Those seek-
ing the resolution's approval lost the battle, but may have won the war
by placing China on the United Nation's human rights agenda - a
significant break from the past practice of ignoring China's human
rights condition. 277
Guaranteeing human rights will undoubtedly bring relief from the
remaining trading restrictions imposed by other nations. While Presi-
dent Bush has been reluctant to be as harsh on China as many in Con-
gress and the U.S. public would have liked, his administration has
rewarded the small positive steps China has since taken in the direc-
tion of human rights. In particular, the safe passage granted to Fang
Lizhi was rewarded with eased trade terms and most favored nation
status.
27 8
Additionally, if China wishes to be a Third World leader, it must
provide a humane model of governance. The Third World has exper-
ienced more than its share of tyrannical rulers and will not follow such
a "leader."
E. Positive and Negative Rights
Economic development and guarantees of fundamental human
rights are not mutually exclusive; indeed, they may complement each
other. However, it is true that rights will be implemented more com-
pletely as economic development continues, because human rights his-
torically tend to expand as new technology and resources enable their
protection. 279
275. See Statement by Chinese foreign ministry spokesman, Xinhua General Overseas News
Service, Sept. 2, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File; Minorities body acts on
hostage-taking, death penalty, other matters, UN CHRONICLE, Dec. 1989, at 27.
276. Id.
277. See Cohen, supra note 113.
278. See. e.g., Andrew Rosenthal, Bush Called Ready to Renew China Trade Status for a
Year, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1990, at Al.
279. SYPNOWICH, supra note 203, at Ill. It could be argued that improved technology
could be used to tighten controls on the population and further restrict rights. In an environ-
ment seeking socialist development through the use of guaranteed rights, this is highly unlikely.
Legally guaranteed rights will limit the government's ability to interfere in the people's exercise
of their rights, regardless of the means. Of course, technology will make the government more
thorough and efficient, thus increasing its ability to track and communicate throughout the na-
tion. If guided by law, this should not pose a threat to rights. It would be self-defeating to
encourage such self-development through law and human rights on the one hand, while stifling it
with new technology on the other. In keeping with the goal of self-realization, technology would
be provided to the people, allowing them to use all the means available to develop themselves.
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China has always emphasized positive rights, such as the right to
work, and other economic rights aimed at raising the standard of liv-
ing. Rights are prioritized in this fashion in order to allow individuals
the necessary material comfort needed to fulfill their potential as crea-
tive, social and self-determining beings. Humanity's spiritual demands
can be met only with a solid material foundation. 280 This underlies
China's historical position that human rights can be realized only
through economic development.
While the rights argued for here are negative rights, which prevent
the State from intervening in certain areas, this does not imply a lower
priority for positive economic rights; they can coexist. Since human
dignity flows from society through participation in basic relationships,
the individual cannot be conceived of as a monad completely in-
dependent and free from community intrusion. Just as negative rights
such as freedom of speech must be tempered in the interest of other
societal goals, so must positive rights be limited in order to protect
property interests. Tempering rights, however, requires defined proce-
dures, and the limitations must be made by an independent court.
There must be clear lines beyond which no intrusion is acceptable.
CONCLUSION
International law sets clear and binding standards for the Chinese
government's treatment of its people. Those standards are found in
the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration, various human rights
treaties, customary law, and, arguably, jus cogens. China has tradi-
tionally maintained that human rights issues are purely an internal
matter. But the linkage of international peace and human rights pro-
tection, along with the commitments made to other nations in multi-
lateral human rights conventions, have made China's human rights
matters a legitimate concern of the international community. Further-
more, China has participated in monitoring human rights violations
by its longstanding membership on the U.N. Human Rights Commis-
sion. This makes China's absolute sovereignty argument vacuous. -
China has not lived up to generally accepted international stan-
dards of human rights. The 1982 Constitution imposes an unequal
system where basic rights are subject to Party manipulation, leaving
most of the population unapprised of their rights. The legal system
has no effective procedural safeguards that inform people of their
This would engender dramatic personal and collective development, thus strengthening the en-
tire society.
280. Guo Jisi, On Human Rights and Development Right, BEUING REV., Feb. 11-17, 1991, at
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rights and enforce those rights against government agencies and offi-
cials. Due process protections are almost completely absent: police
have unusually broad powers to detain some suspects for several years
without judicial review, and many crimes such as "counterrevolution-
ary" activities are politicized, allowing arbitrary arrests, detentions,
and punishments.
In many nations in the West, the ultimate role of a government is
considered to be the protection of individual rights and dignity. No
such ideology exists in China, as a result of a Confucian culture which
has endured for thousands of years. Confucianism did not engender a
rights-oriented legal system or body of law, rather, it left rights up to
negotiation among the parties or local authorities. Along with many
other Confucianist traditions, this has largely been carried over into
modern China. Marxist thought, another powerful influence in mod-
em China, sees little value in individual rights. Accordingly, the Party
has created a system that denies rights to those viewed with political
disfavor.
The solution lies in finding a source of human rights in society
itself. In Chinese culture, dignity is derived from one's interaction
with the society, making it a natural product of society. If dignity and
rights are society-based, and thus subject to historical forces, then
there must be a place for them in socialist society. Guaranteeing fun-
damental rights is necessary for full socialist development as well as
improving trade and political relations. Providing individuals with the
opportunity to fulfill their respective capacities is fundamental to so-
cialism and the people's self-realization, and strengthening the basic
relationships in society will set the people's capacities free.
Guaranteed due process rights are also required in order to inform
people and government agencies of the bounds of the law. A law is
not meaningful if it can be arbitrarily transgressed. But, meaningful
rights cannot be achieved within a framework of constitutionally man-
dated inequality of rights. Procedural law must be implemented to
give effect to the long listing of rights enumerated in the 1982 Consti-
tution. Regulations must also rein in the broad police powers and
force them to perform their jobs without political bias. Due process
will also necessitate fair trials conducted under a presumption of inno-
cence. The people must be armed with knowledge of their rights and
be backed up by firm legal protections in order to truly have rights.
International trade and political benefits are certain to follow
moves to guarantee these basic rights in China. While China has
seemed impervious to international pressures, international sanctions
following the Tiananmen massacre have undoubtedly taken a toll on
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economic modernization and on China's efforts to have secure interna-
tional political relations.
While this Note calls for guarantees of certain negative rights, it
does not suggest rights that would conceivably detract from China's
economic development efforts. The costs of implementing due process
measures and freedoms of thought and expression would be miniscule.
Guaranteeing human rights in China is necessary to fulfill the gov-
ernment's international and domestic roles. It is necessary for al-
lowing the masses to realize their full potential and thereby attain
socialist development. It is necessary in order to gain the economic
and political benefits of international acceptance. Given the current
construction of a new legal system, the time for this transition has
never been more opportune.
